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Abstract
A model of costly medical malpractice claims, based on Bayes Rule, is
developed to examine the effects of physicians being liable for actual damage
under a negligence rule. This model is consistent with empirical evidence
concerning the pattern of claims. It is shown that compensating actual
damage does not provide physicians with appropriate incentives to spend
the second best optimal amount of time with patients or to treat the second
best optimal number of patients. As a result, too much medical malpractice
occurs relative to the second best social optimum.
JEL Classification Numbers: I10, K13
Keywords: Medical Malpractice, Liability
∗School of Economics, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Syd-
ney, NSW, 2006, Australia, Ph: 61+2+93516609, Fax: 61+2+93514341, Email:
don.wright@sydney.edu.au. This research was undertaken while I was visiting the De-
partment of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain. I
thank the department for its hospitality. I also thank seminar participants at the Univer-
sity of Queensland, University of Technology Sydney, and Universitat Pompeu Fabra and
two anonymous referees for helpful comments.
1 Introduction
Numerous empirical studies have found surprisingly large rates of medical
malpractice. The Californian Medical Association (1977) using Californian
hospital data found 1 in 125 patients suffered a negligent medical injury
while Weiler et. al. (1993) using New York hospital data found 1 in 100 pa-
tients suffered a negligent medical injury. These large rates occurred despite
physicians being liable for damage under a negligence rule. In addition, they
are inconsistent with the theoretical prediction of Shavell (1980) that under
a negligence rule all physicians undertake “due care” and as a result there is
no medical malpractice, Danzon (1991). The main innovation in this paper
is the modeling of a patient’s medical malpractice claim decision which when
coupled with physician liability for actual damage provides weak incentives
for physicians to spend the optimal amount of time with patients and to
treat the optimal number of patients. These weak incentives result in too
much medical malpractice.
In this paper, as in Arlen and MacLeod (2005), medical malpractice is
defined as an incorrect diagnosis or treatment that occurs with some positive
probability, where this probability depends on the quality of the service
provided. In turn, physician quality of service depends on the amount of
time a physician spends with each patient. An implication of this approach
is that the optimal probability of medical malpractice occurring is non-zero.
It is just too costly in terms of physician dis-utility of time to eliminate
medical malpractice completely.
However, unlike Arlen and MacLeod, who implicitly assume that when-
ever an incorrect decision is made and damage occurs that a claim for med-
ical malpractice is instigated and is successful in court, this paper formally
models the claim decision. It is assumed that patients know the probabil-
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ity distributions over health outcomes conditional on correct and incorrect
physician decisions. On observing their health outcomes, patients use Bayes
Rule to determine the probability that an incorrect decision was made. This
probability is converted into a probability of winning a claim and a claim
is made if the expected payout from a claim is greater than the cost of a
claim.
It is shown in Section 4.2 that there exists a payment, for which the
physician is liable when a successful medical malpractice claim is made,
that results in physicians choosing the second best optimal amount of time to
spend with patients and treating the second best optimal number of patients.
This payment is similar to that found in Arlen and MacLeod (2005). It is
the difference between the monetary values of the expected health outcomes
under the correct and incorrect decisions scaled up by the reciprocal of a
probability plus an amount equal to the cost of a claim. In this paper,
this probability is the probability that a patient makes a claim, given an
incorrect decision is made, and comes from a model of medical malpractice
claims, while in Arlen and MacCleod it is the exogenous probability that
actual damage occurred.1
The problem with this payment is that it is paid whenever medical mal-
practice is demonstrated regardless of the amount of actual damage done.
Tort law has two basic objectives, the first is to deter misconduct or er-
rors and the second is to compensate victims for any damage inflicted. The
optimal payment above achieves the first objective, but not the second. In
practice, courts compensate patients for actual damage as this is what is ob-
served. In Section 4.3 it is shown that where actual damage is compensated,
1In Polinsky and Shavell (1998) this probability is the probability of being found liable
by a court.
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expected actual damage is less than the difference between the monetary
values of the expected outcomes under the correct and incorrect decisions
adjusted for the cost of a claim. Therefore, compensating actual damage
does not provide strong enough incentives for physicians to spend the sec-
ond best optimal amount of time with patients and to treat the second best
optimal number of patients. As expected, under a negligence rule, there is a
tension between the two objectives of tort law. Either second best optimal
incentives can be provided or actual damage is compensated, not both.
The model developed in this paper yields results that are consistent with
several empirical findings summarised in Danzon (1991). (1) a relatively
large rate of medical malpractice, (2) a small number of claims, (3) medical
malpractice occurs, but no claim is made, (4) a claim is made, but no medical
malpractice occurs, and (5) only the most valuable claims are made.
2 Model Set-Up
A physician can make the correct diagnosis or implement the correct treat-
ment, C, with probability Π and make an incorrect diagnosis or implement
an incorrect treatment, M , with probability (1 − Π). M is interpreted as
medical malpractice. If the correct decision is made, the benefit, b, the
patient receives from treatment is distributed with density f(b|C) and cu-
mulative distribution F (b|C) over [αc, βc]. If an incorrect decision is made,
then patient benefit is distributed according to f(b|M) and F (b|M) over
[αm, βm]. It is assumed that αm ≤ αc, βm ≤ βc, and that F (b|C) first-order
stochastically dominates F (b|M). As a result, the expected benefit of the
correct treatment, EC , is greater than the expected benefit of an incorrect
treatment, EM , that is EC > EM .
The probability of a physician making the correct decision depends on
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the quality of the service the physician provides, q. In turn, quality depends
on the amount of time the physician spends in taking and updating medical
histories, examination, diagnosis, and treatment, t.2 Therefore, Π
(
q(t)
)
or Π(t). It is assumed that the latter function is increasing and strictly
concave. The more time a physician spends with the patient the less likely
is a physician to make an incorrect decision. This set-up is essentially that
of Arlen and MacLeod (2005) with more attention given to the distributions
of possible outcomes.
2.1 Patients
All patients are assumed identical and so have the same density and distri-
bution functions over the benefits from treatment. The expected benefit a
patient receives from treatment by a physician is given by
B(t) = Π(t) · EC +
(
1−Π(t)
)
·EM
= EM +Π(t) · (EC −EM ) (1)
It is assumed that patients are fully publicly insured and so do not directly
pay for physician services. In addition, it is assumed that physicians are
paid by the public insurer.
2.2 Physicians
The number of physicians is fixed at N . All physicians are assumed to be
risk neutral and only value income. The representative physician takes the
price of physician services, p, as given and chooses the number of patients
to treat, n, and how much time to spend with each patient, t, to maximise
2The quality of this time is also important and depends on the expertise of the physi-
cian. The model can be extended so that physician expertise affects the quality of this
time, but this overly complicates the analysis and adds no additional insights.
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net payoff
UP = p · n−D(t · n), (2)
where t · n is the total time spent in treating n patients by a physician with
quality of service, q(t). D(t · n) is the monetary value of the dis-utility of
this time and it is assumed to be an increasing strictly convex function. To
participate, the physician needs payoff, UP = 0, the outside option.
2.3 The Policy-Maker
The policy-maker is risk neutral and maximises the expected net benefit of
n patients being treated by a given physician, subject to the constraint that
the physician participates. That is
max B(t) · n− p · n s.t. UP ≥ 0. (3)
3 Social Optimum - First Best
The constraint in (3) binds and so the social optimum is found by solving,
max
t,n
W ≡ B(t) · n−D(t · n). (4)
for t and n. Assuming a unique interior solution and that the second-order
conditions for a maximum are satisfied, the solution for the social optimum
can be achieved under decentralization, where the physician chooses t and
n, if p = B(t) and the physician receives a per-unit subsidy of s = dB
dt
·n for
time spent with patients.3
3It is assumed that the total number of patients treated at the social optimum is less
than the number of patients seeking treatment. Treating all potential patients this period
may too costly in terms of physician dis-utility of time. A cost could be included in (4)
for leaving some patients untreated, but this would just add another term to welfare and
would have no qualitative effects on the results in this paper concerning liability and time
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This solution involves the physician extracting all the social surplus
through price. This is needed to obtain the efficient activity level and is
an artefact of the expected benefit of physician services being equivalent for
all patients. The problem with this solution is that the policy-maker can
not observe t. What the policy-maker can observe is the outcome or patient
benefit from the services (or at least this can be determined by a court of
law). So instead of using subsidies to reproduce the social optimum, other
authors, Shavell (1980) and Arlen and MacLeod (2005), have demonstrated
that making physicians liable for medical malpractice damage can achieve
the same result.
It should be noted that at the social optimum there is a positive proba-
bility that medical malpractice occurs. That is, even if the physician spends
the socially optimal amount of time with each patient, the physician can
make an incorrect decision.
4 Physician Liability for Medical Malpractice
A tort occurs when one person’s actions result in injury or harm to another
person and this injury can be redressed through the law by awarding dam-
ages. Medical malpractice is a negligent tort. For a medical malpractice
claim to be successful, the patient must prove that an injury occurred, that
the physician caused the injury by action or in-action, and that the action
or in-action represents a failure by the physician to exercise due care which
is defined as the standard care of a reasonable medical practitioner, Danzon
spent on expertise and quality of service by physicians. An alternative would be to model
entry and the number of physicians in the market so that all patients seeking treatment
are treated. This avenue is not followed in order to keep the emphasis on the negligence
rule.
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(1991), Sloan (2008), and Weiler et al (1993). In a medical context, the
two main goals of tort law are (i) to deter medical malpractice and (ii) to
compensate patients for their injuries, Sloan (2008) and Weiler et al (1993).
4.1 A Model of Malpractice Claims under a Negligence Rule
It is assumed that patients can not observe whether a correct or incorrect
diagnosis or treatment occurred. What they do observe is the outcome of
treatment, b. How can they infer from b whether or not they have a claim
for medical malpractice against a physician? Even if b < EM , there can be
some positive probability that the physician treated the patient correctly.
Assume patients have knowledge of the distributions of benefits under
correct and incorrect treatments, f(b|C and f(b|M), as well as the historic
proportions of correct and incorrect treatments, PC and PM = 1−PC . The
patient is in a position to use Bayes Rule to determine the probability of
medical malpractice given the outcome.
In fact, the probability of medical malpractice given outcome b is given
by
P (M |b) =
f(b|M)PM
f(b|M)PM + f(b|C)PC
. (5)
P (M |b) is an decreasing function of b. From the perspective of the patient,
let the probability of winning a claim be W (P (M |b)). Given the balance of
probabilities is used to determine guilt in civil cases it is assumed that4
W = 1 for P (M |b) ≥ .5 (6)
W = 0 for P (M |b) < .5 (7)
4The standard of the balance of probabilities is met if the proposition is more likely to
be true than not true. That is, the standard is met if there is a greater than .5 probability
that the proposition is true
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This particular form for W (·) is chosen because it greatly simplifies the
exposition that follows.
Assume that it costs k to file a claim and that this cost is independent
of actual damage. In addition, assume that the level of medical malpractice
liability, L, is set by the policy-maker and is paid by the physician when the
physician is found guilty of medical malpractice. It is also assumed that if a
claim is made and the physician made an incorrect decision, then based on all
evidence concerning the appropriateness of treatment, the courts determine
malpractice occurred with probability one.5
A patient makes a claim if the expected payout, the probability of win-
ning a claim multiplied by L, is greater than the cost of the claim, that is,
if
W (P (M |b)) · L > k. (8)
Given k > 0, a claim is never made if P (M |b) < .5. Given k > 0 and
P (M |b) ≥ .5 a claim is made if L > k. For the remainder of this section it
is assumed that L > k.
It is assumed that the probability distributions are such that there is a
bc, where for all b < bc, P (M |bc) ≥ .5 and for all b > bc, P (M |bc) < .5. For
interior solutions, bc satisfies
f(bc|M)PM
f(bc|M)PM + f(bc|C)PC
= .5, or
f(bc|M)
f(bc|C)
=
PC
PM
(9)
5Studdert et. al. (2006) found that 73% of cases that involved an error involved com-
pensation and 72% of claims that did not involve an error did not involve compensation.
Peters (2006-7) surveyed many papers and concluded that settlement outcomes are driven
by the strength of the plaintiff’s case. Together, these papers provide evidence that the
courts tend to make correct decisions or are expected to by the litigants. The case where
there is court error in determining whether medical malpractice occurred in the presence
of liability insurance is examined in Fagart and Fluet (2009). They find that decoupling
damages from the victim’s harm can improve efficiency.
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As a result, the probability that a claim is made when medical malpractice
has occurred is F (bc|M).
4.2 The Physician’s and the Policymaker’s Problems under
Medical Malpractice Liability - Second Best
The probability a patient makes a claim is F (bc|M). From the perspective of
the physician, the exante probability that medical malpractice occurs is
(
1−
Π(t)
)
. Therefore from the perspective of the physician the probability that
medical malpractice occurs and a claim is made is
(
1−Π(t)
)
·F (bc|M). Given
that if a claim is made and the physician made an incorrect decision, then
the courts determine malpractice occurred with probability one, then
(
1 −
Π(t)
)
·F (bc|M) is the probability that a physician has to pay L. Therefore,
the expected liability payout of the physician per-patient is EL =
(
1−Π(t)
)
·
F (bc|M) · L.
The physician’s problem is given by
max
t,n
UP ≡ p · n−D(t · n)−EL · n. (10)
Assume a unique interior solution and that the second-order conditions for
a maximum are satisfied.
In the presence of costly claims, if the policymaker could choose t and n
to maximise expected welfare, then its problem is
max
t,n
W ≡ B(t) · n−D(t · n)−
(
1−Π(t)
)
· F (bc|M) · k · n, (11)
where the last term in (11) is the expected cost of claims. Assume a unique
interior solution and that the second-order conditions for a maximum are
satisfied. Let the solution to this problem be t∗ and n∗. This is a second-
best optimum as claims are costly. In the decentralized solution, in which
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the policy-maker chooses L and p, if L and p are chosen so that
L =
EC − EM
F (bc|M)
+ k and p = B(t∗) + (EC − EM ) ·
(
1−Π(t∗)
)
, (12)
then the physician’s problem is identical to the policymaker’s problem and
the physician chooses t∗ and n∗. Let these second best optimal L and p be
denoted by L∗ and p∗.
For L∗, this result is similar to results found in Polinsky and Shavell
(1998) and Arlen and MacLeod (2005), where damage and expected dam-
age, respectively, are scaled-up by the reciprocal of the probability that
the physician be found liable for damage when medical malpractice has oc-
curred.6 In addition, as in Shavell (1999), the physician is made liable for
the cost of a claim. L∗ makes physicians face the marginal social benefit
of increasing t, namely, dΠ
dt
· (EC − EM + F (bc|M)k). The physician now
gets all the social surplus plus an additional amount to provide the correct
incentives for the physician to choose n∗.7 Discussion about the socially
optimal activity level, n∗, is missing from the analysis of Arlen and Macleod
(2005) as there is only one patient. It should be noted that as the cost of a
claim k approaches zero, the second best optimum approaches the first best
optimum and the optimal L approaches EC−EM
F (bc|M)
.
As discussed above, in a medical context, the two main goals of tort
law are (i) to deter medical malpractice and (ii) to compensate patients for
their injuries. Clearly, L∗ yields the second best social optimum in terms of
quality of service and the number of patients treated and so is an optimal
6Polinsky and Shavell (1998) refer to the difference between expected damages and
these scaled-up damages as punitive damages.
7If instead of the physician only valuing income the physician also valued patient utility,
it turns out that the optimal L and p are the same as in (12) above. Therefore, having
more than two types of physicians does not alter the analysis unless the total number of
patients is less than the total number of patients the physicians would like to service.
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deterrent to medical malpractice. However, it fails to compensate patients
for damage they actually suffer. A patient who has successfully claimed
medical malpractice is paid L∗ = EC−EM
F (bc|M)
+ k which is independent of the
amount of damage actually incurred. This is true of Arlen and MacCleod
(2005) and Shavell (1980) as well.
In practice, physicians are liable for the actual damage inflicted on pa-
tients. The object of compensatory damages is to make the patient as well off
as if the correct decision was made, Sloan (2008 p.108), or what amounts to
the same thing, to provide relief for the damages incurred, Cornell University
Law School (2008). Polinsky and Shavell (1998) demonstrate that paying
actual damage (or in some cases punitive damage based on actual damage)
is socially optimal. However, in that paper damage is a fixed amount. In the
framework of this paper, actual damage is not a fixed amount. Therefore,
the effects of physicians being liable for actual damage need to be examined.
4.3 The Physician’s Problem Under Liability for Actual Dam-
age - Third Best
To begin, actual damage needs to be defined. This is complicated by the
fact that the patient outcome might be poor even if the physician made a
correct decision. In this paper, actual damage is defined as the difference
between the benefit a patient expects to receive, given the physician made
the correct decision, and the actual benefit the patient receives, given the
physician made an incorrect decision. That is, the physician is liable for
actual damage, AD = EC − b, when the patient makes a successful medical
malpractice claim.
Given b, a patient makes a claim if the expected payout is greater than
11
the cost of a claim, that is, if
W (P (M |b)) · (EC − b) > k. (13)
As above, if P (M |b) < .5, then a claim is never made. However, if P (M |b) ≥
.5 a claim is made if EC−b > k. That is, if b ≤ bc and b < EC−k. Therefore
a claim is made if
b ≤ min {bc, EC − k}. (14)
Define bk as the b for which (14) holds with equality. A claim is made for all
b ≤ bk. The probability of a patient making a claim for actual damage is,
therefore, F (bk|M). Note that for large k a claim is only made if b is small,
that is, if actual damage is large.
From the point of view of the physician, expected actual damage is
EAD =
(
1−Π(t)
)
·
∫ bk
αm
(EC − b)f(b|M)db. (15)
This is the expectation of EC − b over all b < bk, given medical malpractice
has occurred, multiplied by the probability of medical malpractice occurring.
Remember, a claim is made if b < bk and it is successful ifM occurred. This
happens with probability
(
1−Π(t)
)
.
The physician’s problem is given by
max
t,n
UP ≡ p · n−D(t · n)−EAD · n. (16)
Assuming a unique interior solution, the first-order conditions for a maxi-
mum are
∂UP
∂t
=
(dΠ
dt
·
∫ bk
αm
(EC − b)f(b|M)db −
dD
d(t · n)
)
· n = 0, (17)
and
∂UP
∂n
= p−
dD
d(t · n)
· t−
(
1−Π(t)
)
·
∫ bk
αm
(EC − b)f(b|M)db = 0. (18)
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The second-order conditions for a maximum are assumed to be satisfied.
Let the solution to these first-order conditions be given by t(p) and n(p).
Expected actual damage is an expected transfer from physicians to pa-
tients. If it is assumed that the policy-maker can use a lump-sum transfer to
ensure that the physician’s participation constraint binds, then the policy-
maker’s problem can be written as
max
p
W ≡ B
(
t(p)
)
·n(p)−D
(
t(p) ·n(p)
)
−
(
1−Π(t)
)
·F (bk|M) ·k ·n. (19)
That is, the policy-maker maximises expected total surplus. Assuming a
unique interior solution, this problem has first-order condition
dW
dp
=
(dΠ
dt
· (EC − EM + F (bk|M) · k)−
dD
d(t · n)
)
· n(p) ·
dt
dp
+
(
B
(
t(p)
)
−
dD
d(t · n)
· t−
(
1−Π(t)
)
· F (bk|M) · k
)
·
dn
dp
= 0. (20)
It is assumed that the second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied.
This first-order condition is solved for pˆ and in turn tˆ = t(pˆ), and nˆ =
n(pˆ). This is a third best optimum as it involves costly claims and only one
instrument, p.
Before a comparison of the solution under liability for actual damage is
made with the second best optimum a number of results are derived.
Lemma 1: dn
dp
> 0 and dt
dp
< 0.
The proof of Lemma 1 is in the Appendix. The intuition for the increase
in n in response to an increase in p is clear. An increase in price directly
increases the marginal benefit of treating more patients and so more pa-
tients are treated. This increase in the number of patients treated, directly
increases the marginal cost of total time spent with patients and so t is
reduced.
Lemma 1 ensures that the locus g(n, t) = (n(p), t(p)) is negatively sloped.
This locus is the set of points available to the policy-maker through its choice
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of p. Let the gradient vector of welfare, (19), be given by ∇W = (∂W
∂n
, ∂W
∂t
)
and let the gradient vector of g(n(p), t(p)) be given by ∇g = (∂n
∂p
, ∂t
∂p
), then
(20) can be written as
∇W · ∇g = 0 (21)
That is, at the solution to problem (19), the slopes of the contours ofW (n, t)
and g(n, t) are equal.
Lemma 2: Assume price is fixed at the second best optimum, p∗. If
∫ bk
αm
(EC − b)f(b|M)db < EC − EM + F (bk|M) · k, then t(p
∗) < t∗ and
n(p∗) > n∗.
The proof of Lemma 2 is in the Appendix. The intuition is clear. The
condition that
∫ bk
αm
(EC−b)f(b|M)db < EC−EM +F (bk|M) ·k ensures that
expected actual damage is less than expected physician liability under the
second best optimal L∗. As a result, having the physician liable for expected
actual damage reduces the incentive the physician has to spend time with
patients and also makes treating additional patients less costly relative to
the second best optimal L∗. Therefore, t(p∗) < t∗ and n(p∗) > n∗.
Lemma 3: At t∗, the slope of the constraint, g(n, t), is greater than the
slope of the contours of welfare.
The proof of Lemma 3 is in the Appendix.
Proposition 1: If
∫ bk
αm
(EC − b)f(b|M)db < EC − EM + F (bk|M) · k, then
tˆ < t∗ but the relationship between nˆ and n∗ is ambiguous.
Proof: The constraint, g(n(p), t(p)), is negatively sloped by Lemma 1. By
Lemma 2, if p = p∗, then the solution to the physicians problem is repre-
sented by a point where t(p∗) < t∗ and n(p∗) > n∗. By Lemma 3 and the
convexity of the upper levels sets of welfare around the solution, tˆ < t∗ and
the relationship between nˆ and n∗ is ambiguous.
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The intuition is clear. If
∫ bk
αm
(EC−b)f(b|M)db < EC−EM+F (bk|M)·k,
the expected payout of the physician under liability for actual damage is
less than under L∗. Therefore at p∗, under liability for actual damage,
the physician has less incentive to spend time with patients. The policy-
maker can increase the physician’s incentive to spend time with patients
by decreasing price below p∗, but this is costly in terms of decreasing the
number of patients treated. At pˆ these two opposing effects on welfare are
traded-off optimally.
The solution is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1
Solution to Policy-Maker’s Problem
nn∗ n(p∗)
t∗
t(p∗)
t
g(n, t)
nˆ
tˆ
Proposition 1 demonstrates that physicians spend too little time with
patients relative to the second best optimum and so make too many incor-
rect decisions relative to the second best optimum. L∗ provided the right
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incentives for time spent with patients, but did not compensate actual dam-
age. Perhaps it is not surprising that compensating actual damage does not
provide the right incentives for time spent with patients.
Proposition 1 was derived under the condition that
∫ bk
αm
(EC−b)f(b|M)db <
EC−EM+F (bk|M)·k, but under what conditions does this inequality hold?
Weiler et.al. (1993) found that medical malpractice occurred once in every
100 patients. Therefore, it will be assumed that
Assumption: PM << PC ,
that is, the probability of an incorrect decision being made is substantially
less than the probability of the correct decision being made.
First, consider f(b|C) and f(b|M) as drawn in Figure 2.
Figure 2
f(b|C) and f(b|M) have identical supports and are quite similar
f(b|C)f(b|M)
ECEMαm = αc βm = βc
These two distribution are quite similar and have the same support.
Given the assumption above, the likelihood ratio f(b|M)
f(b|C) <
PC
PM
for all out-
comes b. Therefore P (M |b) < .5 for all b and the patient never makes a
claim for medical malpractice. As a result,
∫ bk
αm
(EC − b)f(b|M)db = 0 <
EC − EM < EC − EM + F (bk|M) · k.
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Second, consider Figure 3. The two distributions are quite similar but
have different supports. In this case bk > 0 exists, however, F (bk|M) is very
small. Rearranging
∫ bk
αm
(EC − b)f(b|M)db yields
∫ bk
αm
(EC − b)f(b|M)db = F (bk|M) · (EC − E[b | b < bk,M ]) (22)
where E[b | b < bk,M ] is the expected value of b, given b < bk and an
incorrect decision is made. Although (EC − E[b | b < bk,M ]) > EC − EM ,
because the expectation in E[b | b < bk,M ] is only taken over relatively poor
outcomes, F (bk|M) is very small. This ensures
∫ bk
αm
(EC − b)f(b|M)db <
EC − EM < EC − EM + F (bk|M) · k.
Figure 3
f(b|C) and f(b|M) have different supports but are quite similar
f(b|C)f(b|M)
ECEMαc βcαm βmbk
F (bk|M)
Third, consider Figure 4. The two distribution are quite different and
have different supports. In this case bk > 0 exists and F (bk|M) is quite
large. Rearranging the condition that
∫ bk
αm
(EC − b)f(b|M)db < EC − EM
yields the equivalent condition
EC >
∫ βm
bk
bf(b|M)db
1− F (bk|M)
or EC > E[b| b > bk, M ], (23)
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where E[b| b > bk, M ] is the expected value of b given b > bk and an incorrect
decision is made. As drawn, bk < βm < EC . Therefore E[b| b > bk, M ] <
EC and
∫ bk
αm
(EC − b)f(b|M)db < EC − EM < EC − EM + F (bk|M) · k.
Figure 4
f(b|C) and f(b|M) have different supports and are quite different
f(b|C)f(b|M)
ECEM αc βcαm βmbk
F (bk|M)
Finally note that if bk = βm, then
∫ bk
αm
(EC − b)f(b|M)db = EC −
EM < EC − EM + F (bk|M) · k. The two supports of f(b|M) and f(b|C)
are disjoint so that any outcome b in the support of f(b|M) is evidence
that medical malpractice has occurred with probability 1. Nevertheless, the
second best optimum is not achieved and the physician spends too little time
with patients compared to the second best optimum because the physician
does not take into account the cost of claims.
In summary, for all possible distributions f(b|M) and f(b|C),
∫ bk
αm
(EC−
b)f(b|M)db < EC − EM + F (bk|M) · k so too many incorrect decisions are
made relative to the second best optimum.
Polinsky and Shavell (1998) showed that scaling up actual damage by the
probability that a physician is found liable for damage attains the first best
social optimum. In the set-up of this paper, if actual damage is scaled up
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by the probability that a claim is made, then the condition in Proposition
1 becomes
∫ bk
αm
(EC−b)
F (bk|M)
f(b|M)db < EC − EM + F (bk|M) · k. Now from
(22)
∫ bk
αm
(EC−b)
F (bk |M)
f(b|M)db = (EC − E[b | b < bk,M ]) > EC − EM and the
condition in Proposition 1 may not hold. If the physician is made liable
for the cost of a claim so that the term F (bk|M) · k disappears from the
condition, then scaling up actual damage results in physicians spending too
much time with patients relative to the second best optimum. The intuition
is clear. Claims are only made when actual damage is relatively large b ≤ bk
and so scaling this amount up by the probability a claim is made when
medical malpractice occurs results in physicians being exposed to too much
liability relative to the second best optimum. As a result, they spend too
much time with patients relative to the second best optimum in order to
reduce this exposure.
4.4 The Model and the Data
The model developed above demonstrates that there is an optimal amount
of time that physicians should spend with patients. Even if this optimal
amount of time is spent, physicians can make an incorrect decision. With
physicians liable for actual damage under a negligence rule Proposition 1
established that tˆ < t∗. As a result, the model predicts too many negligent
medical injuries will occur relative to the second best social optimum. Weiler
et.al. (1993) examined medical injuries in New York hospitals in 1984 and
found that 1% of all patients suffered a negligent medical injury (p. 143).
An earlier study, (Californian Medical Association 1977), used Californian
hospital data from 1974 and found that 1 in 125 patients suffered a negligent
medical injury. A later study, Wilson et.al. (1995), used Australian hospital
data and found an even higher rate of medical malpractice with 1 in 12
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hospital patients suffering a preventable adverse event.8 Finally, Andrews
(1997), using US hospital data, found that 17% of patients experienced
serious adverse events. All of these studies were conducted in an environment
in which physicians were liable for actual damage under a negligence rule.
Although, there is no way of determining the second best socially opti-
mal level of medical malpractice from these empirical studies, it is clear that
substantial medical malpractice occurred. This is in sharp contrasts with
the prediction of Shavell (1980), where under a negligence rule all physicians
undertake ‘due care’ and there is no medical malpractice or medical mal-
practice claims. However, it is consistent with the prediction of this paper
that medical malpractice occurs even at the second best social optimum and
at a level in excess of this optimum.
Another prediction of the model is that patients only make a claim for
medical malpractice after observing a poor outcome, b ≤ min {bc, EC − k}.
Therefore, an incorrect decision can be made and yet no claim is made
because the outcome is not poor enough. Weiler et.al. (1993) found that
only 1 claim for negligence was lodged for every 7 negligent injuries, (p. 69),
the Californian study, Californian Medical Association (1977), found that
only one claim for negligence was lodged for every 10 negligent injuries, and
Andrews (1997) found that only 1 claim for negligence was lodged for every
15 serious adverse events. These findings are consistent with outcomes in
which b > bc and so a claim is not lodged even if malpractice occurred, or
for outcomes in which b is large relative to EC − k. The latter is consistent
with the finding of Weiler et al, (p. 70-71) who found that nearly 80% of
the patients who suffered a negligent injury, but did not lodge a tort claim,
8This Australian study used a more lax definition of an adverse event than the two US
studies referred to above.
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were either fully recovered from the injury within 6 months or were over 70
years of age and so their lost earnings were small (EC − b is small relative
to k). It is also consistent with Danzon (1985) who found that the ratio
of claims to injuries tended to be lower for minor relative to major injuries
(once again where EC − b is small relative to k).
On the other hand, the model also predicts that a correct decision can
be made and yet a claim is made because the outcome is poor. Weiler et
al. found that most claims were ill-founded and that only 1 out of 2 tort
claims were actually paid, (p. 139). Weiler et.al. also found that when
tort claims were matched against independent appraisal of injury only 1 in
6 claims were found to involve medical negligence.9
5 Conclusion
This paper has examined the incentive effects of tort law under a negligence
rule in the case where actual damage is compensated. It was shown that even
in the case where the distributions of benefits, under correct and incorrect
treatment, are such that patients assess the probability of malpractice as one,
that compensating patients for actual damage does not lead to the second
best optimum as litigation costs are not taken into account by physicians
when making their decisions about how much time to spend with patients.
As a result, too much malpractice occurs relative to the second best social
optimum.
On the other hand, as litigation costs approach zero and so the second
best approaches the first best social optimum, compensating actual damage
only yields the second best (first best) social optimum in the case where the
9Presumably the courts had access to more information than the appraisers, so that 1
in 6 became 1 in 2.
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distributions of benefits, under correct and incorrect treatment, are such
that patients assesses the probability that malpractice has occurred as one.
For all other distributions too little time is spent with patients and too much
malpractice occurs relative to the second best social optimum.
Therefore, although compensating actual damage makes the patient as
well off as if the correct decision was made it does not provide physicians with
the appropriate incentive to spend the second best socially optimal amount
of time with patients in the presence of litigation costs and/or where the
probability a patient makes a claim when an incorrect decision is made is
less than one.
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6 Appendix
Lemma 1 - Proof: Totally differentiating first-order conditions (17) and
(18) and applying Cramer’s Rule yields
dn
dp
=
∂2D
∂t2
· n− d
2Π
dt2
·
∫ bk
αm
(EC − b)f(b|M)db
∆
> 0, (A-1)
where the numerator is greater than zero by one of the second-order condi-
tions for a maximum and ∆ > 0 is the other second-order condition for a
maximum, and
dt
dp
=
−∂
2D
∂t2
· t
∆
< 0. (A-2)
Lemma 2 - Proof: The physician’s problem can be rewritten as
max
t,n
UP ≡ p · n−D(t · n)−
(
1−Π(t)
)
·X · n, (A-3)
where X is the expected liability payout if a mistake is made. Totally differ-
entiating the first order conditions for a maximum and applying Cramer’s
rule yields
∂t
∂X
= sign
[dΠ
dt
·
∂2D
∂n2
· t2 +
∂2D
∂n2
· t
]
> 0 (A-4)
and
∂n
∂X
= sign
[
(1−Π) ·
(d2Π
dt2
·X −
∂2D
∂t2
· n
)
−
dΠ
dt
·
∂2D
∂t2
· n · t
]
< 0. (A-5)
The inequalities in (A-4) and (A-5) follow from Π(t) being an increasing
concave function and D(t · n) being an increasing convex function.
From (11) and (12), at the second best optimum X = EC − EM +
F (bk|M) · k. Under liability for actual damage X =
∫ bk
αm
(EC − b)f(b|M)db.
As EC −EM +F (bk|M) ·k >
∫ bk
αm
(EC − b)f(b|M)db, t(p
∗) < t∗ and n(p∗) >
n∗.
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Lemma 3 - Proof: From (A-1) and (A-2) the slope of the constraint,
g(n(p), t(p)) is
dt
dp
dn
dp
=
−∂
2D
∂t2
· t
∂2D
∂t2
· n− d
2Π
dt2
·
∫ bk
αm
(EC − b)f(b|M)db
< 0 (A-6)
Applying the implicit function theorem to (11) gives the slope of the
contours of W , namely,
dt
dn
= −
∂W
∂n
∂W
∂t
= −
( B(t)−D′(·) · t− (1−Π(t)) · F (·) · k
B′(t) · n−D′(·) · n+Π′(t) · F (·) · k · n
)
(A-7)
Rearranging the first order conditions of problem (11) yields
B(t)− (1−Π(t) · F (·) · k
t
= B′(t) + Π′(t) · F (·) · k, (A-8)
which is solved for t∗. Substituting (A-8) into (A-7) yields the slope of the
the contours of W at t∗, namely,
dt
dn
= −
t∗
n
(A-9)
By inspection, at t∗, the slope of the constraint is greater than the slope
of the contours for all n.
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